

Ferries and several pontoon bridges to keep the formations that escaped at Falaise free to retreat.

In the Seine bend near Rouen, German troops succeeded in making one of the destroyed bridges passable again by inserting a piece of pontoon. The units piling up on the Seine try to reach the other bank on punts, ferries and boats, even on empty fuel barrels. Among the smoldering wrecked vehicles lie countless dead and wounded soldiers left to fend for themselves."

Apparently, "practitioners" among General EISENHOWER's German helpers had no qualms about intervening to aggravate this catastrophe.

In fact, there seems to be a discrepancy between the cold-bloodedness with which important members of Army Group B and OB West sent the soldiers entrusted to them into the consciously accepted defeat, and the effort they made for their own well-being.

A prisoner of war in the Allies testified¹ that the officers of the ROMMEL, KLUGE and MODEL General Staffs thought little of anything but their own amusement and paid little attention to how the battle unfolded after D-Day developed.

On the other hand, they enjoyed themselves in Paris. 75,000 liters of high-proof alcohol were diverted monthly for this purpose by Army Group B. The chief quartermaster of Army Group B and his assistant, Oberschirmmeister DAHLKE, had procured these "playing expenses" from the Quartermaster General West. The POW also related an incident in which the Quartermaster General's driver (a colonel whose name the POW had forgotten) returned in a 12-cylinder Lincoln vehicle from Paris to Fontainebleau, where he had driven his boss for pleasure had to return to fetch a liver pâté that had been forgotten there.

1 CSDIC (UK), SIR1632,
20 April 1945, p. 7.

When the German headquarters had to move back to Germany from France, Major JAMIN had 28 trucks from a bridge convoy confiscated in order to transport champagne and wine back to Germany.

One has to imagine that there was a lack of bridge-building materials and engineer units everywhere because the Anglo-American air forces had destroyed the vital bridges. Therefore, during the evacuation of France, the retreating columns backed up in front of destroyed river crossings, and then the commander of the army confiscated

group headquarters, of all things, 28 bridge construction trucks to transport spirits, i.e. to ensure their own well-being in the midst of the catastrophe of flight and destruction.

By the looks of it, this postwar news was considered hot enough to be kept secret for decades. The readers can make up their own minds about the reasons.

The staff of 'Air Fleet 3' was in a hurry to withdraw from France

During the retreat from France, parts of the staff and the rear services of the "3rd Air Fleet" behaved so cowardly and irresponsibly in their push backwards that relations between the Army and the Air Force in the West were poisoned for a long time.

Whole columns of trucks with valuable booty and (real) Special powers strove primarily for the saving German borders, past the cries of the wounded who were pushed aside by the "robber columns" on the roadsides. No one knew where they got the special powers from. Uniformed hustlers using the war in their own way!

Reichsmarshal GÖRING issued an edict depriving all personnel of the 3rd Air Fleet of all supply advantages as punishment for their cowardly behavior during the retreat, and demoted the Luftwaffe on 22 April 1941. September to the Luftwaffe Command West (LuKdo West). The flying units, whose badly battered remnants had escaped the infernal furnace in France, may have felt this censure as unfair, while the conspirators among the staff of the former "Air Fleet 3" may have acknowledged this with a secret smile at the success of their measures.



Chapter 10

The military and economic Effects of the Normandy invasion

In the vicinity of Aachen, which had already been conquered by the 9th US Army in October 1944, fierce fighting developed.

Dept. 1: military**Triumph and tragedy of General Eisenhower's German aides**

In August 1944, almost all of the German Western Army's equipment was either destroyed in the Battle of Normandy or left lying by the side of the road during the retreat from France for lack of fuel or salvage options.

In a seemingly unrestrained flight, the Wehrmacht retreated to the Scheldte- Vosgesen position ordered by HITLER, hoping to be able to resist again there and in the positions of the former Siegfried Line.

Although General EISENHOWER's German helpers had helped the Allies to win the Battle of France, their ultimate goal of capitulating the German western army and opening up the German front to facilitate an Allied advance on Berlin was no longer achieved.

In fact, after the Normandy success, it looked as if the Western Allies had all but achieved final victory. Significantly, an Allied report from September 1944 reported 'that organized resistance led by the OKW was unlikely to break through 01. Dec. will last, yes... it may end even sooner...«1

On the way to the river Seine, the Allied troops had already caught up with the Normandy invasion, which the defenders had fought so bloodily for, and had achieved a lead of 13 days over the plan. General PATTON had reached the Moselle on the 96th day after the start of the invasion, for which Allied planners had planned 300 days.

Individual German officers were still planning to abandon the western front. The reinstated commander of the 116th Panzer Division, Count SCHWERIN, intended to disband his division when it reached the German border. This was prevented by his officers, however. The same applied to his alleged attempt to hand Aachen over to the Americans. Later, Count SCHWERIN, who afforded his own bodyguard for the divisional staff, sent a letter to the Americans. However, the original message was leaked to HITLER , which led to the ' SCHWERIN Affair '

1 FALIN, *The Second Front. The conflicts of interest of the anti-Hitler coalition*, Knaur, Munich 1997, p. 454.



George Patton.

2 Heinz Günther GUDERIAN, *From Normandy to the Reich*, AUSA 2001, pp. 147-163.

Reich Marshal
Hermann GÖRING in
Nuremberg in 1946 to
Werner BROSS, his
defense attorney's
assistant (in: *Conversations
with Göring* Arndt, Kiel
2003, p. 139): "But even up
to the Anglo-Saxon invasion
of France, the outcome of
the war was favorable in
the area chance, and even
then many mistakes were
made! The west wall is z.
B. In 1944 it was even given
up in places that were
considered impregnable, in
some cases given up
without a fight!«

These mistakes meant that the almost tangible final victory was lost in the distant future, to the advantage of the Soviet Union and at the expense of terrible blood sacrifices by all warring parties.

It started with the Allies, untrained in war of movement, failing to recognize that the 'panic German retreat' from France was a war of movement operation that was carried out fairly successfully. The result was false self-confidence.

After an American armored division had broken through the West Wall in the first attempt on September 16, 1944, the Germans succeeded on September 22, 1944 in throwing the Americans out of the West Wall again.

The stubborn battle for Aachen, which fell into Allied hands on September 29, 1944 after bitter resistance, showed that the German resistance had recovered.

Field Marshal MONTGOMERY then made the biggest mistake when, in September 1944, he attempted a bold maneuver ('Operation Market Garden') from Holland to attack the Ruhr area. He failed in the bloody Battle of Arnhem due to German intervention reserves – and the remnants of SS Panzer troops that escaped from Falaise, with more Allied soldiers being killed than in Normandy.

Now it became clear that the Western Allied troops were stuck despite almost unlimited air supremacy, although about two-thirds of the German Wehrmacht were stationed on the Eastern Front.

However, certain events of September 1944 should indicate that General EISENHOWER's helpers were still active. The Allies only succeeded in their first advance on the West Wall because they were able to cross a strategically important railway bridge near Mesch on September 11, 1944, which the highest orders were not allowed to destroy beforehand. Of course, so is the name

of this command giver remained unknown.¹

¹ Helmut RITGEN, *Western Front 1944*, Motorbuch, Stuttgart 2004, p. 169.

The Allied supply problem and the "surprise" conquest of Antwerp

After winning the Battle of France stood out for the Allied always larger supply problems, because besides that Port of Cherbourg and the artificial "Mulberry" port near Arromanches, endangered by North Sea storms, they still lacked another large supply port with sufficient unloading



On September 4, 1944, the British infantry, which had captured the port of Antwerp, inexplicably forgot to garrison the strategically most important bridges.

capacity. The other important Channel ports such as Calais and Dunkirk were still in German hands and were to remain so for the most part – as in the case of Dunkirk – until the end of the war.

It is all the more astonishing that the Allies, in a lightning action on Monday, September 4, 1944, at dawn in the Tournai area, advanced across the border into Belgium and headed for Antwerp. Without encountering German resistance, the English were able to take the harbor and the large docks of the city undamaged by the evening.

According to Field Marshal KEITEL and General JODL, the German high command was completely taken by surprise by the sudden loss of Antwerp. Even in 1946 they were unable to explain the reasons for this.¹ To this day, it has never been clarified exactly how Antwerp was lost to the Allies in a flash

without a fight, and its huge harbor facilities fell into British hands completely undamaged. Military historians seem to regard the capture of Antwerp as a 'blank spot', and it is quite conceivable that

¹ David C. ISBY, *The German Army at D-Day* (Greenhill 2004), p. 83.

General EISENHOWER's German helpers were involved. The staff of the German 'Military Commander in Belgium' (under General VON FALKENHAUSEN until July 20, 1944) was riddled with supporters of the military resistance. Do you want to describe all this as 'coincidence'?

After Antwerp had been played into their hands like a ripe fruit, the English made a fatal mistake and failed to seize the bridges over the Albert Canal on the northern edge of Antwerp.

When they wanted to make up for this omission, the German defense was already organized and prevented this. So the important connection to the island of Walcheren remained in German hands. In bitter fighting, the Wehrmacht managed to keep their positions on both banks of the Scheldt estuary to the North Sea under control for the next three months, so that the port of Antwerp remained useless to the Allies for a long time. In the night from 15 to 16 September 1944, three German combat swimmers from MEK 60 under Lieutenant PRINZHORN succeeded in destroying the Kreuzschanz lock in Antwerp with a torpedo mine.

It was not until January 28, 1945, after the Scheldt estuary had been fought free and after more than ten weeks of repair work on the Kreuzschanz lock, that the first Allied supply convoy could enter the port of Antwerp.

The ›West Wall Miracle‹: critical situation in the West after the successful landing for both warring parties


Despite the defeat in Normandy, the newly stabilized western front held out until February 1945. People still talk about the "West Wall Wonder" to this day, but there is more to it than that.

At Arnhem, Aachen, Metz and later in the Hürtgen Forest the Allied onslaught was once again halted. In the case of Metz, the observant first general staff officer of the 17th SS Panzer Division, Sturmabführer LINN, had succeeded in intercepting the paralyzing measures of unknown high command and in rescinding "inhibiting" orders.

In fact, with the successful establishment of Anglo-Americans on the continent, the war had taken another ominous turn for Germany. Sooner or later, the ›Second Front‹ threatened to drag Germany into the abyss.

In a last-ditch effort, HITLER attempted to turn the tide of war around once more and to split the Western Allies with the offensives in the Ardennes (December 1944) and in northern Alsace (January 1945).

'Strange' orders and sabotage (keyword 'Ardennes



Fuel replenishment⁽⁴⁾ have also played an uncanny role in the failure of both counterattacks.

The bold blows of the enemy, who had already been defeated, brought the Western Allies to the brink of catastrophe around the turn of the year 1944/45, and even after the failure of the Ardennes offensive, the otherwise optimistic US tank general PATTON wrote in his war diary on January 4, 1945 : »We can still lose this war. This remark is remarkable because I have not written anything similar at any other time.' In fact, even after the Ardennes divisions had withdrawn to the east, the initiative throughout the west seemed to have passed to the Germans. Even before the Ardennes offensive, Field Marshal MONTGOMERY had written on December 7, 1944: "Just like the German war since 01. Sept. 1944 is performed in Europe, the German should

The German Ardenna offensive in the winter of 1944-1945, which demonstrated the shortcomings of US strategy. The Allies could himself only thanks Mate establish rial superiority and air supremacy. From: *The Second World War*, Vol. 4: *Total War*, Hamburg 1989.



The 'famous' Arnhem Bridge. To secure the bridges over the Rhine, which were important for the further advance of the Allies, extensive British and Polish airborne units had come down. 1,130 Britons and Poles were killed in the fierce fighting and 6,450 were taken prisoner.



The primary objective of the Ardennes offensive was to break through the Allied front and cut off their supply lines from Antwerp. Here: Men of the 6th Panzer Army attack.

cal war to continue throughout 1945.« All gains from the Normandy invasion were again in danger of being lost.¹

Ultimately, however, the fate of the western front was decided by the Russians, who broke through the eastern front with their major offensive from the Baranow bridgehead on January 11, 1945 with dire consequences for the Germans, which resulted in the withdrawal of a large part of the combat-capable German troops from the western front .

The overwhelming Russian success was partly made possible by 'strange' mistakes made by the defense, which are amazingly reminiscent of what happened on the Atlantic Wall.

In response to CHURCHILL's call for help on January 6, 1945, STALIN had brought forward his major offensive in Poland. On the same day, HITLER decided with a heavy heart to stop fighting in the Ardennes and to move the 5th and 6th Panzer Armies to the Eastern Front.² When HITLER's adjutant GÜNSCHE brought HITLER's order to Army Commander Sepp DIETRICH , the Obergruppenführer was as pleased as von Don been touched. He said: "Everything is prepared for the forcing of the Maas ... If my army is withdrawn, then the way to the Rhine will be free for the English and Americans." That's exactly how it was then, and one recognizes again the fate of the two-front war meant for Germany in 1944/45.

The period following the Normandy invasion was the period of World War II that claimed the greatest casualties on both sides of the front.

It remains to be seen whether the war could be ended more quickly thanks to the actions of General EISENHOWER's German helpers. At least the relatives and surviving dependents of the soldiers who died in the West have to mourn the deaths in their families thanks to these "omissions".

From a strategic point of view, it was clear to the German leadership from the end of 1941 that the war could no longer be won by conventional means. So there must have been another factor under which the stubborn German resistance must be seen - and that was the gain in time. The Allies were also aware of this.

The Ardennes offensive alone had postponed the Allied advance across the Rhine, which was originally supposed to take place in September 1944, by another valuable six weeks.

¹ Howe H. SAUNDERS, *The Watch on the Rhine. Hitler's last battle in the Ardennes 1944/45*, Vowinkel, Berg 1984, p. 270 ff.

² Henrich EBERLE and Matthias UHL, *Das Buch Hitler*, Lübbe, Bergisch Gladbach 2005, p. 3.

Dept. 2: Economic Consequences of Allied Success

»Occupy all secret research facilities from the air!« Or how the USA wanted to react to a sudden German collapse in 1944

In August 1944, the USA, like their German accomplices, was fully reckoning with the possibility of a sudden German withdrawal from the war. They wanted to make provisions for this eventuality and take control of the most important secret German test and development facilities. Official microfilm documents prove

see it.

1 Director of Technical Services, "Subject: Outline Plan For Seizure of German Aircraft Research Establishments," August 11, 1944.

For example, there is a secret document dated August 14, 1944 from the Director of Technical Services of the American Air Force to the Commanding General of Headquarters of the US Army.¹ According to this, the US armed forces planned an abrupt occupation in the event of an imminent German withdrawal from the war of all important German air force test stations by American airborne troops, regardless of whether they were in areas assigned to the other occupying powers. It also expressly spoke of the possibility of occupying special test facilities located in the future Russian zone.

The code word for this plan was removed from the released microfilm documents, arguably to discourage further investigation by interested historians.

On the American side, there were two possible ways in which a German withdrawal from the war, which was expected soon, would take place:

By a formal capitulation of the German General Staff with German soldiers maintaining order (ROM MEL's or VON KLUGE's plan?) or by the defeat of a large part of the German army with subsequent chaos, partisan fighting and uprisings. It can be seen that these expectations were entirely influenced by the previous negotiations with the various German groups.

In the event of such a withdrawal, all German air force test stations, which were all located near airfields, were to be suddenly occupied by massive deployments of American airborne troops and thus before the Germans destroyed themselves and probably also before the other allies of the USA could take them be secured. It should be here primarily about the

Technologies of the future such as jet engines, rocket engines and atomic bomb technology have gone. Their monopoly ownership by a single victorious power seemed to guarantee almost exclusive claims to world domination. This seemed worth every risk.

To achieve this, it was planned to convert five hundred war-weary B-17 and B-24 four-engined bombers into emergency transports which, together with German transport aircraft withdrawn from other theaters of war, would bring highly mobile and largely self-sufficient airborne troops to the vicinity of the test sites. There, the airborne troops, equipped with their own anti-aircraft guns, anti-tank guns and light trucks, were to protect captured personnel and material until suitable research teams (T-Forces) arrived. It was estimated that it would take about three months for the airborne troops to withdraw after the "work was done".

The list of goals attached to the plan expressly shows that, in addition to aeronautics research centers, other high technologies should also be at stake.

Contrary to all expectations, however, the expected sudden departure of Germany from the war did not materialize in the summer of 1944, and whatever the goals of the high-ranking German traitors may have been, the situation stabilized despite the Allied victory in the Battle of Normandy Western Front in the autumn of 1944, which culminated in the Battle of Arnhem, when Field Marshal MONTGOMERY 's attempt to use large-scale airborne troops to create the conditions for an advance by Allied troops against the Ruhr area and as far as Berlin was thwarted.

At the same time, this daring maneuver was intended to eliminate the danger of the German V-2 bases in Holland. Since August 1944, when the Battle of Normandy had already passed its climax, the Allies had been counting on a German nuclear strike against London and were therefore preparing corresponding evacuation plans for the English metropolis. The Arnhem airborne landing failed, however, with great casualties, and if the Germans had ever intended to shell London with nuclear-armed V-2s, SS-Obergruppenfuhrer KAMMLER's rocket troops could have done so from Holland well into April 1945 .

The American secret plan of August 17, 1944 was the ingenious culmination of the American policy outlined by US General MARSHALL , with the help of a successful Allied landing in Normandy, the Germans the development and use of their

Making nuclear weapons impossible while getting these developments into American hands. We know today that the American 'Manhattan Project' for the production of the American atomic bomb was in crisis until April 1945.

The successful Allied landing in Normandy may have bought the Allies the time they needed to narrowly prevent the use of German nuclear weapons in connection with the completion of intercontinental weapons. In my two books, *Hitler's Victory Weapons* and *Atomic Target America*, I have shown that these weapons existed at the end of the war. In this respect, the Normandy invasion was decisive for the war.

But if the intention was to get Germany out of the war quickly via the successful invasion of Normandy by capitulating the western German army, followed by a rapid Anglo-American advance to Berlin and, as a special "bonbon", an exclusive one US access to the German research laboratories should follow, this variant failed miserably.

After the successful invasion of Normandy, a series of negotiations took place between the Germans and the Allies, which, in view of the clearly imminent defeat, were now mainly conducted by official representatives of the Third Reich with the Western and Eastern Allies, in order to achieve a total capitulation, as required by the Allied Ab come foreseen to prevent still. Exactly what happened after the Normandy invasion, what agreements were made, kept and broken, and what 'commodities' the Germans (arts and technology) offered the Allies in order to get concessions from them will probably remain unknown for a long time since the today's view of history would have to be revised again if the details became known here.

Due to a combination of various circumstances, the Americans did not succeed in the spring of 1945 in getting their exclusive hands on the important German military inventions.

At the end of the war, the German secret technology was distributed worldwide over an area from Argentina to Japan, and the allies of the USA also got their share of the loot. Nothing came of the total monopoly of one victorious power over the others.

Economically, too, the Third Reich and the German economy reacted quickly to the situation that arose after the successful Allied landing in France.

Economic exploitation: Vannevar Bush and the successful Normandy invasion

The Normandy invasion has had a very strong impact on the world economy to this day.

The landing on the continent was not just about the atomic bomb. The success of the Anglo-American landing in France, which became apparent in August 1944, set alarm bells ringing in American industrial circles. As in the arms sector, in the civilian sector it was also a matter of who could secure the largest lion's share of the expected booty.

The hunting grounds of the plunderers were not only the Third Reich, but, as is often forgotten today, also the other countries occupied by the Germans before and during the war and especially their industrial manufacturing and inventor potential. This can be documented with figures: by the end of 1944, 115 "targets" had already been visited by the Allied CIOS teams tasked with such spying and booty missions. With the exception of Aachen and Strasbourg, hardly any towns belonging to the real Reich had fallen into Allied hands. So you must have been somewhere else.

On August 28, 1944, the first Anglo-American CIOS team entered the newly liberated Paris to examine military and war economy secrets.

On the same day, Vannevar BUSH, in the USA, suggested hunting for a completely different type of game.¹ Vannevar BUSH was then director of the OSRD (Office of Scientific Research and Development). He suggested to the American Secretary of War and Secretary of the Navy that, in addition to military information, technical information of an "industrial nature" should also be obtained from the occupied territories and from Germany itself. Such information, he argued, would not only fuel its own war effort against Japan, but would also help American industry to attain its later place in world trade and create unprecedented employment opportunities for US veterans to be discharged after the war. This makes it clear what the real issue was. To do this, the military weapons search teams should be supported by US corporate industry and technology teams that had their own long-term goals and purposes.



Vannevar BUSH.

¹ John GIMBEL, *Science, Technology, and Plunder. Exploitation and Plunder in Postwar Germany*, Stanford University 1990, p. 4 ff.

Numerous companies reacted to Vannevar BUSH's suggestions men, agencies and private individuals immediately with enthusiasm,

Vannevar BUSH and Harold L. ICKES, both from the American petroleum industry, saw a particular threat in the German program to produce synthetic fuels from gas, coal and shale. In their opinion, clear conditions had to be created here as to which country should have industrial dominance in the post-war period. Energy sources and their management played a crucial role then as now.

BUSH was determined not to give a peace-converted German industry with its advanced technology a chance to compete with the Americans for world markets. The BUSH proposals of August 28, 1944 provided for a plundering and exploitation of the science and technology of German researchers and industrial companies, which was superior to the Americans in many areas until the end of the war

1 See: Friedrich GEORG:
Company patent theft
1945-55, Grabert, Tübingen
gen 2007 (in preparation,
autumn 2007)

This program began at the end of the Normandy invasion and only ended with the formation of the new Federal Republic in 1949. Its benefits to American private business have been astronomical and extend well into the 21st century. It is unparalleled in world economic history for its size, its seamless application, and its (deliberate?) failure to distinguish between spoils of war, reparations, and mere theft.

For their part, German industry and the political leadership were well aware that the Allied success in France threatened to spell the end of the German economy. Two weeks before the American exploration and plundering program came into being, attempts were being made to ward off the danger of an 'economic Versailles' as far as possible.

Germany defends itself: the conference of August 10, 1944 in Strasbourg

On Sunday, July 30, 1944, American armored divisions broke through at Avranches and captured the free Ge

country of western France. With the now possible transition from stubborn defense to large-scale mobile warfare by motorized troops, the Normandy invasion as a landing operation had come to a victorious conclusion for the Allies. The success of the Allied landings in Normandy alarmed

the German industry with all urgency that the end of the Third Reich was imminent. The Allied war demands for an unconditional surrender and the experiences of the Germans with the Peace Treaty of Versailles did not bode well for the German economy.

Under the highest security measures, Reich party leader Martin BORMANN therefore had a new economic initiative taken, which took place on August 10, 1944 in the Strasbourg Hotel Maison Rouge. Leading representatives of the German corporations were present, some from the "Freundeskreis Reichsführer SS". Among others, there were the representatives of Krupp, Röchling, Messerschmitt, Rheinmetall-Borsig, Brown and Boveri, Siemens, Wintershall, Bosch, IG Farben, VW and others, as well as leading employees of the Reich Ministry for Armaments and War Production, the Reich Ministry of Economics and the Naval Construction Office .1, 2

In the opening speech, the conference leader, SS Obergruppenführer Dr. SCHEIDT (director of Hermsdorff & Schönburg Co.): »The battle for France is lost! German industry must know that the war cannot be won... Every German industrialist must contact foreign companies and conclude contracts with them. This must be done individually and without arousing any suspicion. In addition, preparations must be made for taking out sizeable foreign loans for the time after the end of the war.« Martin BORMANN added that »Germany must take steps to ensure timely economic recovery«. According to American information, German companies bought at least 750 foreign companies in the months that followed, including 214 in Switzerland, 112 in Spain, 98 in Argentina, 58 in Portugal and 35 in Turkey. BORMANN assured the companies and institutions that they would protect them against any violations of the Third Reich's foreign trade and war economy laws until the fall of the Third Reich. This law, for example, called for the death penalty for those who flouted foreign exchange regulations.

A critical point was the assessment made at the conference that it would take nine months to successfully complete the planned capital flight program ›Action Eagle Flight‹.³ This meant that the Wehrmacht had to hold off the Allied advance throughout the winter of 1944 and up to the beginning or end of that year. end of May 1945 would have to delay. In fact, the war in Europe ended then only two

1 Julius MADER, *Der Banditenschatz*, Verlag der Nation 1973, 5. 5-11.

2 Martin ALLEN, *The Himmler Conspiracy 1943-45*, Druffel, Stegen 2005, pp. 325-332.

3 Paul MANNING, *Martin Bormann: Nazi in Exile*, Lyle Stuart 1981, p. 32.

Days before the end of the nine months estimated at the conference. In addition to the state-protected ›capital flight program‹, other Strasbourg program items included a post-war foreign trade offensive and the creation of a European economic community.

There were no minutes of this conference. Those present were politely but firmly informed that they were not allowed to take notes.

As a result of this measure, the Allies did not get wind of the details that had been decided until November 1945. By then, much of the flight capital had been housed never to be seen again.

The conference took place under the protection of the greatest possible secrecy and the strictest security measures conceivable at the time.

The most modern security techniques, including electronic surveillance by SS technicians, were used to secure the Strasbourg Conference.

Nevertheless, the unbelievable happened: On August 11, 1944, a heavy American air raid on the otherwise strategically completely unimportant city of Strasbourg took place "surprisingly". The hotel district near 111 and the historic center around the cathedral with Place Gutenberg were particularly hard hit. In today's tourist guides about Strasbourg, the attack

9/11 bomb damage

August 1944 at the Place Gutenberg near the ›Maison Rouge‹. The banner bears the words: "This is the work of the Americans."



of August 11, 1944 presented as a "mistake". Oddly enough, on August 12, 1944, the *newest news in Strasbourg* was allowed to write the following: "The airdrop from Strasbourg was no coincidence and no mistake." Documents from the 401st Bomber Group prove, however, that the attack was not a

mistake in aiming, since one could have aimed directly with "good to excellent" results if one had a decent view of the ground.¹ Everything becomes clear when one considers that the hotel 'Maison Rouge' was right in the bombed zone. It can therefore be assumed with some certainty that the Allies were aware of the meeting and wanted to do something about it.


In anticipation of the conference, Martin BORMANN resorted to one of the oldest security measures to prevent attacks: the date of the meeting was simply brought forward at short notice.

The question that will probably never be answered is who informed the Allies about the top-secret conference in Strasbourg. The economic history of post-war Europe would probably have been completely different if the conference had taken place a day later in the 'Maison Rouge'.

The 'Maison Rouge' conference is also one of the consequences of the Norman the-invasion, which has had an impact well into our time.

¹ Mathieu ROY, *Des civils en première ligne? Les bombardements aériens alliés dans le Nord-Est de la France, 1940-45*, Maîtrise d'Histoire

con temporaire,
Université Marc Bloch,
Strasbourg II 2004



Chapter 11

**At the last moment?
Marshall spoke the truth**

On October 12, 1944, on the southern tip of the Bug peninsula on the island of Rügen, General MARSHALL 's worst fears were to be exceeded ...

**From the summer of 1944, did the Germans have only hope?
Hitler and the Miracle Weapons**

Despite the Allied successes in France, HITLER was convinced by July 1944 that Germany would somehow win the war. In front of each of the many visitors from the Wehrmacht, industry and state who visited him on the Obersalzberg in the early summer of 1944, he went into the deep seriousness of the situation, but expressed himself so convincingly positive about the further course of events that the majority of the visitors left the Berghof confident and optimistic.

But when HITLER left the Obersalzberg on July 15 (forever, as it turned out), this attitude had changed significantly. According to the impressions of his adjutant Nicolaus VON BELOW, he was now clear about the outcome of the war. His last hope was only new weapons and their effects, which should ensure last-minute success for the German side.

**The new importance of the time factor for the warring parties after the
Battle of Normandy**

The loss of the Battle of Normandy and the associated emergence of a "wide front" in Europe made the "time factor" extremely important for the badly battered Third Reich.

After Adolf HITLER had recognized since December 1941 that the war could no longer be won conventionally, it was now clear that the chances of a draw were disappearing faster and faster.

All that mattered now was to buy time for Germany, no matter what the cost: time for the Third Reich to make it possible to perfect the weapons of victory that might guarantee victory at the last minute, time for HITLER, to await a political breakup in the opposing coalition, and time for German industry to prepare for a post-war period of Allied dominance if all went wrong.

But things were also brewing on the Allied side.¹ Relations between the western powers and the Soviet Union were so bad in September 1944 that the Anglo-Americans were prepared to conclude a separate peace with Germany. However, HITLER ordered the talks with representatives, which had begun in Stockholm at the English request, to be continued

¹ Henrik EBERLE and
Matthias Um (eds.), *Das
Buch Hitler*, Lübbe,
Bergisch Gladbach

of the Foreign Office because the English demanded that HITLER be removed from power beforehand. The Fuehrer declared: "I will show the English gentlemen that peace with Germany can only be achieved with me, not without me."

In my book *Hitler's Victory Weapons*, Volume 1, I described how in September 1944 HITLER had new hopes for a "Second Seven Years' War" after the Germans had once again temporarily succeeded in defeating the huge masses of the Allied armies in the East and West before they could flood the German borders across the board.¹

¹ Friedrich GEORG, *Hitler's Victory Weapons*, Vol. 1: *Air Force and Navy*, Amun, Schleihsingen 2001, p. 27.

If all hopes of political rifts in the Allied camp turned out to be futile, the Germans thought they could resist until the summer/autumn of 1945. Many of the crucial weapons would have been ready by then.

Of course, the Western Allies recognized this danger and did everything they could to achieve final military victory before then.

Prevented conventional decision-making weapons: falcon, puma and owl, stupidity or sabotage?


As can be seen below, Joseph GOEBBELS described them to ROMERSA in October 1944 as a great German hope: the night combat weapons.

One of the lessons learned from Normandy was that German armored formations could hardly be deployed by day without running the risk of being destroyed by Allied air forces. Thus the great German counter-attack 'Operation Liège' against Mortain and Avranches had actually been beaten off by Allied aircraft.

Possible short-term solutions were to use well-camouflaged tanks from defensive positions or to undertake offensive actions exclusively at night. The Wehrmacht therefore had the systems ›Puma‹ (›Panther‹ tanks with FG 12/50 or FG 12/52 infrared night vision devices), ›Falke‹ (armored infantry fighting vehicle Sd.Kfz. 251 with FG 12/50 and FG 12/52 for driver and machine gun) and ›Uhu‹ (Sd.Kfz. 251/20 with 60 cm infrared searchlight Beob. Ger. 12/51) for battlefield illumination.² The night vision devices of ›Puma‹ and ›Falke‹ had their own range of 400 m and should fight each other in the night un

² Bruce CULVER and Uwe FEIST, *armored personnel carrier*, Ryton Publ. (1996), p. 53 ff.

support.



Infrared night combat systems: 'Puma', 'Falcon' and 'Owl'.

The 60 cm infrared headlight of the 'Uhu' could transmit an infrared beam up to a range of 1500 m. The battlefield, which was invisibly illuminated in this way for the enemy, could then be viewed through the Falcon's and Puma's own night vision devices.

There were even camouflage uniforms for soldiers in the infrared band, so that their own troops could be distinguished from foreign troops in night combat.

With this equipment, the German tanks and their crews would have had a gigantic advantage over the Allied troops in night combat.

For 'inexplicable, irrational reasons, infrared close combat equipment had many opponents in the Wehrmacht. In August 1944 there was a large staff conference at the OKH (Army High Command). Based on the Normandy experience, the majority of the generals present were of the opinion that effective night operations for armored units were only possible if suitable night vision devices and observation systems such as the FG 12/50 and FG 12/52 were available. To the surprise of the generals present, a high-ranking general staff officer (name unknown!...) decided: "Gentlemen, I can't understand what all this modern stuff is about, the front is happy with what we have." In reply several generals would have left the conference room indignantly, but it was in vain.¹ The night-vision devices, which had been manufactured with so much effort and expense, had to be removed from the vehicles and were stored in a former mine in the Austrian mountains.

¹ W. TROICA, *Pz.Kpfwg. V Panther*, Aj-Press 1999, quoted from: Igor WITKOWSKI, *Truth about the Wunderwaffe*, European History Press (2004), p. 110 f.

Only a symbolic amount of FG 12/50 and FG 12/52 was allowed to remain. It was only in April 1945 that some of the devices were used against the English on the Weser and the Soviets in front of Berlin with annihilating success.

Military experts are of the opinion that large-scale use of German night vision devices in the Battle of the Bulge and in repelling the large-scale Russian attack from the Baranov bridgehead could have been decisive.

As it was, however, the night vision devices had to be stored in mine tunnels while hundreds of Allied fighter-bombers in the Ardennes brought the German tanks to a standstill during the day – as they had done in Normandy.

When GOEBBELS told ROMERSA unaware of the infrared devices as a great German conventional hope for the future, were

the weapons that had no counterpart on the Allied side had already been removed.

Stupidity or Sabotage? The reader guesses the answer!

The Impact of the Invasion on the Use of the "Weapons of Victory"

After the success of the Normandy invasion, the German 'Siegeswaffe' plans of action ran into serious problems as London and New York were now more difficult to reach due to the greater distance.

Difficult, but not impossible!

It would have been possible for the Germans to shell London at any time as they approached across the North Sea using airborne V1, while V1 launched by submarines were ready for action against New York from late autumn 1944. With the V-2, London could have been kept in the crosshairs until the end of March 1945, with the A-4B and A-9 rockets even well into April. The New York missile had reached the pre-production stage when the first A-10 ICBMs were tested in the spring of 1945. But that wasn't all, because one or two intercontinental bomber types with a 'New York range' could have made their risky flight across the Atlantic from Norway in the spring of 1945 if the order had come.

France as a base of victory weapons was by the advances of Technology replaced by 1945.

What all of these delivery weapons needed were nuclear warheads to bring about a war decision.

The Normandy landings almost came too late, or: the event of October 12, 1944

At the southern tip of the Bug peninsula on the island of Rügen, October 1944 General MARSHALL 's worst fears were exceeded:

1 Norberte LAHUERTA,
in: Edgar MAYER U,
Thomas MEHNER, *Hitler
and the Bomb*, Kopp,
Rottenburg a. N. 2002, p. 76 ff.

»Yesterday news, today history«

Hitler's »Secret Weapons«, something more than »just« imagination
by Luigi ROMERSA¹

“The story I am about to tell is based on certain experiences/events that I personally witnessed and which, at the time, before the war was over, many were too quick to label as fantasies. The American, British and French secret services also initially thought it was just a fantasy, but this opinion had to be changed in order to protect themselves with all the means at their disposal.

I'm talking about the German secret weapons associated with the name, or rather, with the genius of Wernher VON BRAUN .

I had a brotherly friendship with him from 1944 until his death.

That Germany, towards the end of the war, possessed an arsenal of arms which, compared with what was used by her enemies, defied the imagination, is now an acknowledged, indisputable fact.

Declaring official victory, CHURCHILL said in 1945: 'The discoveries which we have recently made on German, Dutch and French territory show that the enemy's collapse saved Great Britain from a terrible peril. The Allied armies At the last moment destroyed the snake in its breeding ground.'

Colonel DL PUTT , Commander of American Forces in the Occupied

Territories, expressed himself no less clearly as CHURCHILL when assessing the cessation of operations. "Just a few more weeks and the Germans would have used a crucial weapon: atomic bombs, of which they had two, would have been built into the V-2."

Mussolini's Doubts

Much was said about the existence of new weapons with which the Third Reich wanted to radically change the art of war, but without further details. The Germans gave their allies (especially the Italians) little information.

MUSSOLINI was dying to know more, but received only brief comments. HITLER and MUSSOLINI spoke about the secret weapons for the first time at a meeting in April 1944 at the castle

Klessheim near Salzburg. This meeting lasted three days. With MUSSOLINI came Marshal Rodolfo GRAZIANI and with HITLER VON RIBBENTROP, KEITEL, DOLLMANN and Ambassador RAHN. The first conversation lasted about an hour. HITLER described the global political and military situation. Only the guide spoke, and he flooded his guests with many impressions and remarks, all with a certain optimistic mood. He assured that the war would surely be won. He walked around the room and said, 'We have airplanes, invisible submarines, huge tanks and cannons, incredibly powerful rockets and a bomb with effects that will surprise the whole world. The enemy knows this, he is attacking us, he is destroying us, but we will respond to this destruction with the storm, and without unleashing a bacteriological war, which we are also ready for. All my words correspond to the purest truth. That will be confirmed!'

MUSSOLINI returned to Garganao, on Lake Garda, where he had his residence, somewhat reassured, but he clearly wanted to know more. 'In the autumn of 1944 I was summoned to Orsolina's villa, where the head of the 'Social Republic' lived with his family, and here the Duce instructed me to travel to Germany, as he explained to me, 'more of to see these things about which I only got superficial reports in Klessheim. I can understand the guide's discretion very well, but at least I should have more precise information. I give you this most important assignment for which I have written these credentials.' One of the letters was for GOEBBELS and the other for HITLER.

report of a witness

I traveled to Germany by car. At HITLER's headquarters in Rastenburg, East Prussia, the head of the Third Reich personally read MUSSOLINI 's letter and allowed my presence at some of the experiments. I started with the underground factories, concentrated in Bavaria and Upper Silesia.

The underground factories mentioned were small cities built inside mountains. There were elevators that would take you inside these facilities, just like in a normal mine.

The well camouflaged entrances were guarded by patrols and defended with machine guns and artillery. Huge, always

gleamed tunnels, kilometer after kilometer, connected with the help of small trains that transported people and material.

In any case, the strongest point of the German ›arms arsenal‹ was the dissolution bomb (in Italian ›Bomba Disagregatrice‹), i.e. the atomic bomb, which was tested for the first time on an island in the Baltic Sea, on Rügen. In the night from October 11th to 12th, 1944 I was back in Berlin. A military car picked me up at the Hotel Adlon; I had my lodgings there. One of the officers in the car informed me that Minister GOEBBELS would meet me on my return from this trip. I asked where we were going but they didn't answer. We left at two o'clock in the night. It rained all the time. A light but persistent rain from a low sky with fibrous clouds. At 10 a.m. we reached our destination. Only when I got out of the car did I realize that we were on the Baltic Sea coast, near Stralsund, and that we were going to take a motorboat to the island of Rügen. This was the proving ground where many German weapons were completed; a secret place, guarded by special units, inaccessible to anyone who did not have a permit card from the Wehrmacht High Command.

We entered an area sheltered by trees. Stone houses and cement shelters were prepared in a large area of the forest. We went into a semi-underground tower through a metal door, which was immediately closed. There were four of us: my two companions, a man in overalls and I.

'We will see a test of the dissolution bomb. It is the most powerful explosive yet discovered. Nothing can withstand him,' said one. He almost didn't breathe. He checked his watch and waited until noon, the hour allotted for the experiment. Our observation point was a few kilometers from the point of the explosion. 'See you tonight - tonight' - added the man in overalls - 'you will have to stay here. They can only go out in the dark. The bomb emits lethal radiation that can be extremely harmful. Its radius of action is much larger than that of the most powerful conventional bomb. About a mile.'

It was raining harder now. Suddenly the phone in the shelter rang. Headquarters informed that the experiment would take place earlier, at 11:45 am. In the bunker, at the height of our eyes, there was a loophole equipped with a smoke glass. I could only see trees and unused land-


hen. The phone rang again. We were given the exact time and we all synchronized our watches. Suddenly a terrible noise shook the walls of our tower. Then came a blinding light. A thick curtain of smoke spread across the field. Nobody spoke. With my eyes on the smoke lens, I saw this dense cloud coming toward us. We were devoured by her. The feeling was that the tower was falling into an abyss. Finally, the man in overalls, who was a colonel from the Heereswappenamt (the body that prepared the weapons), broke the silence and said, 'What we're going to confirm today is extremely important.' Once we're ready, ours To drop a bomb on the invading forces or an enemy city, Anglo-Americans must carefully consider whether it is worth prolonging the war or ending it sensibly. We have been researching for years. After long and tedious experiments and works, we have finally completed this invention. We have plants everywhere. Some were hit and damaged, particularly in Norway; but in Peenemünde everything is intact (undamaged), although the Allies tried to destroy it. Mass production of the bomb will begin in six or seven months. Everything will change then; but some are concerned because of the use of this terrible drug.' About 4 p.m., in the semi-darkness, some shadows appeared. They ran to our shelter. They were soldiers and they wore an alien wet suit. They came in and quickly closed the door again. ›Everything is broken!‹ said one when he had taken off his protective suit.

1 If this is a literal quote from the man who can probably be equated with Colonel GEIST, this means that there had already been successful German A-bomb tests before

We too had to put on a whitish, rough, fibrous coat. I can't tell what material this coat was made of, but by touch it could have been asbestos.

The hat had a piece of mica glass in front of the eyes. We put on tall but very light boots and protected our hands with gloves made of the same fabric as the cloak. We left the tower in a line led by soldiers. As we got further and further away, the terrain became more and more confused. It was cold and wet to the bone in this forest that looked as if a wave of fire had engulfed it. Suddenly my foot hit something. It was the corpse of a charred goat. The houses I had seen only a few hours earlier were gone, reduced to rubble.

The more we look at the explosions



Peninsula Bug with the test site of the German atomic bomb of October 12, 1944. A crater with a diameter of 30 m and glazing can still be seen there today. According to oral reports, the diameter of the crater before it was leveled was 200 m. Glazing and melting can still be measured there, as well as beta and alpha activities that are well above normal. The cesium and uranium activities (4238) are also abnormally high ...

approached the point, the more terrible the devastation looked. The grass was an odd color and looked like wash-leather, and the trees that were still standing were bare of leaves.

What Goebbels said

In the night I returned to Berlin. At the end of October I had a conversation with GOEBBELS at his house in Unter den Linden. It was our first personal meeting. He was wearing a gray suit with a white shirt and a blue tie with red stripes.

He was short and had a rather dark face with lively eyes.

'I know from Under Secretary NEUMANN,' he said, 'that you saw the experiment on Rügen. With these and other means, which we will be producing in large numbers in a few months, we can decisively hit the enemy. The dissolution bomb, the series production of which began with a significant delay to the planned date, will be the great novelty of this century. A countermeasure, if there is one at all, can only be imagined much later; then the war will be over long ago ...'

He paused and added: 'Permitted by the special submarines with snorkels and turbines; of the new Radio Controlled V-Bombs, the last of which will be an incredible surprise; from the high-speed airplanes, from the remote-controlled missiles A-4 and A-9, with a range of several thousand kilometers and propelled by an engine consuming a mixture of alcohol and liquid oxygen; from all that our technology has created with unbelievable sacrifices and years of development work, we await the miracle. We still have a few more months to grit our teeth, endure and respond as best we can. We need time. 24 hours can be decisive.' When I asked whether the Allies knew these secrets, he replied: 'Without a doubt. Their secret services work without a break.'

These never-ending bombing raids by hundreds of planes are a testament to the enemy's nervousness. CHURCHILL is for sure the smartest and smartest of our opponents...

He knows that the possibilities of our technology are unlimited. The English and North Americans are looking for the factories of the vengeance weapons. They particularly attack Peenemünde and the heavy water installations,

but with little success. In order to support the work of the bomber planes, they sent saboteurs to the east German coast and to Norway, in Norway a heavy water installation was badly damaged.

The heavy water is an important substance for the production of the dissolving bomb. We made progress in this direction even before the war, but research was suspended as war operations developed favorably. The Fuhrer, like many of his associates, was convinced that the struggle could be ended victoriously without having to resort to weapons of this kind. Professor Otto HAHN gave Germany the amazing discovery of nuclear fission. On June 6, 1942, I took part in a crucial conference on atomic research. The guide asked the scientist how much time it took to get positive results. At least two years, they replied.

HITLER said it was too long, but he asked for the experiments to continue without setting an exact date. It was not until 1943 that he changed his mind, and now work is being done very quickly and with great difficulty. When asked whether the dissolution bomb alone could decide the war, he answered:

'Not quite. If we also have good infantry and tanks along with the bomb, it's another matter.

We will equip these infantry and tanks with weapons that the enemy cannot even imagine.

We have new guns, missiles and instruments so we can see in the dark and shoot accurately. We have a dozen remote-controlled missiles that are amazing in power and accuracy. When the enemy sees a rain of A-4 and A-9 missiles, the first with ten-ton nuclear heads and the second with fifteen-ton nuclear heads, falling on him, he will have to consider whether it is worth fighting on... ‹ (Author's note: This is more likely to mean a one-ton warhead for the A-4 and 1.5 tons for the A-9.)

GOEBBELS added: 'Our only problem now is staying power. Under our circumstances, anyone else would have given up long ago. Day and night the enemy bombers drop tons of bombs on us in the hope that we will collapse. We only need six or seven months at most. I know there are many, but everything is at stake; something crucial! Germany's salvation depends on its geniuses.' These were his last words before parting.

The months GOEBBELS spoke of passed and the war ended in German defeat. Very few of the amazing means mentioned were used, so many who had always said that the secret weapon was just a propaganda lie had been vindicated. But as I wrote at the beginning, neither CHURCHILL nor the high command and the secret services (including the Russian ones) were of this opinion. Their concerns, as they found out for themselves after the end of the war, were well founded."

Who is Luigi Romersa ?

The Italian star journalist Luigi ROMERSA was allowed to publish this report of his trip to Germany in 1944 several times and unchallenged in well-known military magazines of the post-war period in Italy. He became famous at the end of the 1950s when a ten-part series of articles he wrote about his trip to the USA to see Wernher VON BRAUN appeared in leading newspapers. He certainly wasn't a fantasist!

The successful test at Rügen had far-reaching consequences: the German atomic bomb, which the Allies had undertaken their costly Normandy invasion to prevent, went into production in the form of a small tactical version from mid-October 1944. According to German traitors, their absolutely deadly effective range was several hundred meters around the point of impact – the A-bomb test on Rügen on October 12, 1944 was just as strong.

Luigi ROMERSA with his
friend Wernher VON
BRAUN.

Large German nuclear bombs with a potency of 6 kilos
meters around the point of impact would
have become operational from October
1945, according to British information.

The potential use of small German
nuclear weapons became a sinister threat
for the Allies. The use of 6 to 12 of these
tactical weapons was planned in the
Ardennes offensive by He 177s of KG 100
or FW 190s of the Einhorn special squadron.
It did not take place, nor did the nuclear
loading of V1 and V-2, which was worked on
until the end of the war.



1 Headquarters United States Strategic Air Force in Europe, Office of the Director of Intelligence, "An Evaluation of German Capabilities in 1945", August 19, 1945, printed here: pp. 1 and 6.
Source: »Investigations, Research, Developments and Practical Use of the German Atomic Bomb«, August 19, 1945, RG 38, Entry 98 C, Box 9.

Confirmation of the German atomic test from the air: US Strategic Air Forces document of August 19, 1945.

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A.P.W.I.U. (Ninth Air Force) 96/1945
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APG 696, U S Army
19 August 1945

SUBJECT: Enemy Intelligence Summaries

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TOP SECRET

INVESTIGATIONS, RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENTS, AND PRACTICAL USE OF THE GERMAN ATOMIC BOMB

THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION WAS OBTAINED FROM FOUR GERMAN SCIENTISTS: A CHEMIST, TWO PHYSICAL CHEMISTS, AND A ROCKET SPECIALIST. ALL FOUR MEN CONTRIBUTED A SHORT STORY AS TO WHAT THEY KNEW OF THE ATOMIC BOMB DEVELOPMENT.

1. After the first atomic bomb was released over Hiroshima recently, several Germans began talking about whatever little they knew in this field of German research. Out of the many stories received, the following were selected.

2. Dr. EDSE, well known chemist, wrote:

At the Institute for Physical Chemistry of the Hamburg University I worked on problems concerning nuclear physics under the direction of Prof. Dr. P. HARTMANN, and engaged in investigations of behavior and properties of the so-called trans-uranium, already mentioned by HAHN and STRASSMANN in Berlin, and by JOLIO-Curie in Paris.

3. These new elements originated from uranium bombarded by slow neutrons. As the experimental results exhibited some incorrectness and because there were symptoms leading to the disintegration of the nucleus of the uranium, we began making theoretical calculations to investigate the possible disintegration as a whole.

4. Before we were able to report theoretical investigations, U.S. physicists confirmed the reality of the disintegration of the nucleus of uranium when bombarded by neutrons, an fission that the disintegration of one atom delivered an energy of 160 Million Volts. Another result of these investigations was that the disintegration of a piece of uranium, containing only the nucleus $^{235}_{92}\text{U}$, produces an explosive of enormous powers.

5. This disintegration delivers besides the lighter atoms like Strontium (Sr) and Xenon (X) neutrons to which in turn hits another nucleus and forces it to disintegrate. This process, which is termed "chain reaction", is very quick and delivers an enormous quantity of energy.

6. However, the theory could not be proved for no experiments could be made, because the ordinary uranium does not produce this explosion, but, like the theory predicted, only the isotope with the number 235 poses this quality.

7. Uranium has three isotopes and is composed of:

0.006% : $^{234}_{92}\text{U}$; 0.720% : $^{235}_{92}\text{U}$; 99.274% : $^{238}_{92}\text{U}$.

The uranium isotope $^{235}_{92}\text{U}$ is separated from ordinary uranium when the chain reaction, the uranium explosion, takes place.

8. This is a difficult problem and requires effective methods of adsorption and desorption to separate the isotopes. I developed in particular the method of desorption and adsorption, while afterwards adding to it the chromatography method, which turned out to be very effective, as indicated by several experiments.

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46. The problem of harnessing the released energy in the sense of using it as power for engines, factory machines, transportation (ground, water, air), has not been practically solved as yet. This side of uranium research is clearly a post war problem.

47. A man named ZINSSER, a Flak rocket expert, mentioned what he noticed and dry: In the beginning of Oct. 1944 I flew from Ludwigs-lust (South of Luebeck), about 12 to 15 km from an atomic bomb test station, when I noticed a strong, bright illumination of the whole atmosphere, lasting about 2 seconds.

48. The clearly visible pressure wave escaped the approaching and following cloud formed by the explosion. This wave had a diameter of about 1 km when it became visible and the color of the cloud changed frequently. It became dotted after a short period of darkness with all sorts of light spots, which were, in contrast to normal explosions, of a pale blue color.

49. After about 10 seconds the sharp outlines of the explosion cloud disappeared, then the cloud began to take on a lighter color against the sky covered with a gray overcast. The diameter of the still visible pressure wave was at least 9000 meters while remaining visible for at least 15 seconds.

50. Personal observations of the colors of the explosion cloud found an almost blue-violet shade. During this manifestation reddish-colored rings were to be seen, changing to a dirty-like shade in very rapid succession.

51. The combustion was lightly felt from my observation plane in the form of pulling and pushing. The appearance of atmospheric disturbance lasted about 10 seconds without noticeable climax.

52. About one hour later I started with an He 111 from the A/D at Ludwigs-lust and flew in an easterly direction. Shortly after the start I passed through the almost complete overcast (between 3000 and 4000 meter altitude). A cloud shaped like a mushroom with turbulent, billowing sections (at about 7000 meter altitude) stood, without any seeming connections, over the spot where the explosion took place. Strong electrical disturbances and the impossibility to continue radio communication as by lightning, turned up.

53. Because of the P-38s operating in the area Wittenberg-Marsburg I had to turn to the north but observed a better visibility at the bottom of the cloud where the explosion occurred.
 Note: It does not seem very clear to me why these experiments took place in such crowded areas.


FOR THE COMMANDING OFFICER:

Helene T. Fretzberger
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 Captain. 10

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Heinkel He 111
 H special observation
 and film aircraft for
 rocket tests in
 Peenemünde and
 Karlshagen.
 ZINSSER used one
 of these machines
 for its two observation
 flights of the nuclear
 test on October 10, 1944.

Under 47.-53. The anti-aircraft missile expert ZINSSER described how he undertook two flights from Ludwigslust to the area of the explosion with a special observation He 111. His description of the side effects of an A-bomb explosion is all the more remarkable because his testimony to the OSS was made in mid-July 1945 – i.e. before the Hiroshima bomb was dropped.

ZINSSER's description of the color of the cloud, the numerical values of the extent and duration of the explosion, his mention of radio interference and his description of the timing of the explosion of October 1944 are even more precise than WL LAURENCE 's later description of September 9, 1945 about the Nagasaki atomic bomb blast. Measurements by international seismographic institutes also confirm noticeable deflections in the area of the German Reich around October 10, 1944, i.e. a few days before the events on Rügen. According to their results, the strength of the bomb must have been 5 to 10 kt.

Was what Romersa saw really the first German successful atomic bomb test?

In fact, new research suggests that ZINSSER did not in fact fly over Rügen, but over the area of the Sandkrug and Neustadt-Glewe military training areas. It can be assumed that ROMERSA would never have been shown a risky atomic bomb test if successful tests had not been carried out beforehand.


Figure next page:
 Nuclear test in

the Sandkrug
 restricted military
 area? The

reconstruction of
 ZINSSER's flight
 path seems to
 strongly indicate this possibility.

Rommel's "Atomic Bombs"?

On April 1, 1998, a group of Spanish researchers had an interview with former Spanish master spy Angel Alcasar DE VELASCO



Angel Alcázar DE
VELASCO - Interview
with ›Paco‹ and ›Antonio‹
on April 1, 1998

by.1 It took place in La Navata-Galapagar, about 50 kilometers northwest of Madrid. During this conversation, the former insider suddenly turned to the Normandy invasion and told his interviewees that Field Marshal ROMMEL had two atomic bombs at his disposal during the Normandy invasion. Another general gave them to him and said: "Here it is, two nuclear bombs, you have to drop one, and if you don't do that, they will use yours against us." According to VELASCO, this was expressly not an order from the Fuhrer, but rather the order of a general superior to ROMMEL. As things stand, only KEITEL, JODL, VON RUNDSTEDT or VON KLUGE could be considered here. Unfortunately, DE VELASCO did not say who it was. General SPEIDEL was in control of the other bomb.

DE VELASCO then suddenly became ambiguous and more and more silent, as if he had already said too much about it. As the interview continued, the impression arose that he wanted to say that General SPEIDEL also had control of the nuclear weapons after ROMMEL and that Field Marshal ROMMEL should not use both bombs but only one against the landing. DE VELASCO indicated at the beginning of the interview that another destination had been suggested to ROMMEL (London? - Editor's note), and then he suddenly wasn't so sure anymore whether he wanted to give the interviewers such information. DE VELASCO further confirmed that Adolf HITLER did not want to use the two bombs in Normandy and that more atomic bombs would be built by the German side. Here, too, he expressed himself in Sibylline, saying: "Yes, but smaller, they were the first ones." This passage seems unclear, especially in the Spanish original, and allows two conclusions: The later bombs seem to have been smaller than the first ones to be, or the small bombs were the first.

Will we ever know the truth?

A testimony from 1966 before the MfS in Arnstadt reported that around the time of the bomb attack on July 20, 1944, two German atomic bombs had actually been completed by atomic researchers in Stadtilm.

Did the invasion of Normandy really threaten the use of the first atomic bombs?

An early German bomber version consisted of lead-jacketed ones

Bullets which, in contrast to later uranium and plutonium bombs, had layers of lightly infused with liquid paraffin

cherten uranium plates were filled. Assuming suitable ignition processes, this weapon could have triggered a low-intensity atomic bomb explosion with the help of a radium-beryllium preparation as a neutron source. The strength of this explosion would have been in the range of 1 kiloton - enough for a landing beach.¹

In Stadtilm, however, scientists also speak of bombs with a deadly effect within a radius of 20 kilometers.² This is reminiscent of H bombs.

We know that the question of the German atomic bomb played an important role in German military resistance circles on July 20, 1944. Wasn't it their last hope, by demonstrating the effectiveness of such a bomb, to dissuade the Allies from their demand for unconditional surrender after the assassination attempt on HITLER had been successful? Statements by Stadtilm nuclear scientist Dr. REHBEIN, in connection with the events of July 20, 1944, point out that after the attack failed, the atomic bomb would never be used and that the war was thus lost.

What happened to the two alleged atomic bombs in Normandy? On August 5, 1944, Adolf HITLER reported to the Romanian head of state, Marshal ANTONESCU, about the German atomic bomb, the development of which had reached the testing stage. But he expressed hope that the scientists and weapons developers working on the new explosive would not attempt to use it until they were certain they understood what they were dealing with.

Did the Normandy invasion save the Allies from German nuclear missiles?

"The Germans were preparing rocket surprises for the whole world in general, and Britain in particular, which would probably have changed the course of the war had the invasion been postponed for as little as six months." So said Colonel DL PUTT, then Deputy Commanding General Intelligence (T-2), in an address to the SAE (Society of Automotive Engineers) in New York on March 7, 1946. PUTT knew what he was talking about: since January 1945 he had commanded the technical service of the ATSC in Europe. He then led Operation Lusty to take over secret German Luftwaffe technology. In August

1 Friedrich GEORG, *Hitler's Victory Weapons*, Vol. 2: *Star Wars 1947*, Part A, Amun, Schleusingen 2003, pp. 147-15

2 Interrogation protocol MfS Arnstadt district office of July 6, 1966 with master plumber Erich RUNNAGEL, regarding the former research center for nuclear fission in Stadtilm, in: Edgar MAYER and Thomas MEHNER, *The Secret of the German Atomic Bomb*, Kopp, Rottenburg a. N. 2001, p. 198-202.

In 1945 he took over the T-2 post at Wright Field dealing with all classified booty technology evaluation.

For the Allies, too, the Normandy invasion was a race against time.

Chapter 12

What remains

Did the invasion pay off politically and militarily for the Allies?

»Tragically a near-disaster«, wrote Victor Davis HANSON on March 9, 2005 in the *Wall Street Journal* about the fighting in Normandy.

Anyone who visits the holiday destination of the Normandy coast today will come across not only the remains of the former German Atlantic Wall but also the numerous war cemeteries of the invasion battle. Here, only a few kilometers apart, long rows of blossoms of German, American, English, French, Canadian and Polish youth lie side by side in neatly ordered and tended graves. Therefore, more than sixty years after these events, one must be able to ask whether the Battle of Normandy paid off politically and militarily for the Allies or whether it was unnecessary and contributed to prolonging the war.

The fact is that the Allies suddenly prepared for the Normandy invasion in the spring of 1944 as quickly as possible. For them, the invasion of France was the quickest route to the heart of Germany, but it was also the hardest and bloodiest route. It also meant in the long run the end of all English dreams of a trans-Adriatic operation, of a push through the Ljubljana narrows into the Pannonian Basin. CHURCHILL then foresaw the danger that the victorious Red Army represented for Eastern Europe, and he hoped to be able to banish it with the conqueror's rights in the Danube region in the Balkans. He

wanted to wear down the Third Reich with a series of advances against its weakly defended flanks and at the same time smash the German heartland from the air.

Had this plan gone through, it might have delayed the Normandy landings, made them unnecessary, and probably prolonged the war, but it would probably have cost the United States and Britain and Germany fewer lives in the end. The conquest of East Germany by the Soviet Union might have been prevented in this way.

This strategy would probably also have helped to limit the Russian sphere of influence in Central Europe and the Balkans in the post-war period.

In the opinion of General Mark CLARK, commander of the American Fifth Army in Italy, a Mediterranean campaign could have been the decisive campaign for post-war development. This opportunity was not seized.¹

The Normandy landings, if viewed in the right perspective, were militarily successful. But it did not lead to the political triumph that this great military victory actually deserved.

On the other hand, it must not be forgotten that the Allies were actually concerned with preventing the German atomic bomb when they decided in great haste to go to Normandy instead of undertaking the more promising 'Danube campaign'. It was also a question of capturing the V-weapon bases in France, which threatened England and the USA with victory weapons and about whose development the Allies were extremely well informed through their own espionage services and German betrayal.

The intercontinental weapons bunker at Wizernes and the A-10 missile base at Haut-Mesnil would have been ready by 1944, while since the fall of 1943 BV 222 six-engined long-distance boats had been waiting in Biscarosse for an attack on New York. Two Ju 290 tankers and two Ju 290 bombers had been located at the Mont de Marsan airfield as a further transatlantic weapon system since the spring of 1944 in May/June 1944. They too could have reached New York.

Against this background, the events surrounding the Normandie invasion to be seen.


What did General Eisenhower's German aides achieve?

Was the 'liberation of France' so colossally celebrated today really a 'betrayed' (German) victory?

It is a fact that the 5. General Eisenhower's Column significantly helped the Allies through treason, sabotage, false reports and delaying actions to cripple German defense efforts and win the Battle of France. Nevertheless, the Western Allies, who were vastly superior in terms of men and material, still needed more than four months for this.

In 1940, the Wehrmacht, easily inferior to the Anglo-French defenders, completed the same feat in just six weeks.

The common war goal of the Allies and German helpers was to bring about an end to the war in the west as quickly as possible if the invasion was successful. The German side hoped this would lead to a victorious defense of the eastern front against the Soviets, if possible with the help of the Anglo-Americans. This plan failed miserably. All that was achieved was that the



1994 D-Day
Celebration at Omaha Beach

From: *Der Spiegel*, No.
23/2004.

Western Allies came much closer to their war goals - which some German supporters fully accepted as their own. There is no evidence anywhere that in the summer of 1944 the Anglo-Americans were seriously prepared to defend the German Eastern Front with the blood of their soldiers. The Americans were primarily concerned with occupying Germany as quickly as possible and exclusively capturing German technology in order to achieve the economic and scientific monopoly in the post-war period.

Despite terrible slaughter on both sides after the Battle of Normandy, the western front held out from September 1944 to February 1945. It was STALIN who brought the western powers the relief they had been looking for with a major Russian offensive on the eastern front in mid-January 1945 and showed his appreciation for this in Yalta with territorial claims that the Anglo-Americans could not refuse.

The consequences of these agreements lasted until the end of the Cold War in the 1990s.

Churchill's Fears of a New Battle for France in 1945

The Normandy invasion had given the Western Allies a beachhead in Western Europe, but questions were asked about leading Allies. Imagine what would happen if the Third Reich succeeded

to rebuild weakened defensive fronts and to stabilize them in such a way that his scientists could continue to work undisturbed on jet planes, Walther submarines, atomic bombs, ICBMs, round wing aircraft, etc.

Today we are led to believe by 'historians' that nothing of the sort existed. Those who knew about it firsthand during and after the war saw it very differently, no matter which side of the front they were on.

Nobody today can claim that Sir Winston CHURCHILL was a timid man. CHURCHILL, who was well informed about German developments, declared in early October 1944 that if the Allies had not won the war by March 1945, the Germans would be able to turn the tide of the war with the new weapons and throw the Allies back out of France.²

CHURCHILL's comments were hardly coincidental at the time the Germans tested a revolutionary weapon: On October 12, an atomic bomb was successfully detonated in the southern part of the Bug peninsula on the island of Rügen. Thus, at the end of 1944, the US researcher Philip MORRISON, who was responsible for investigating Germany's atomic bomb project, learned that the Germans had probably tested an atomic bomb. Was treason involved here, too, or did this go back to xenon-122 measurements that the Americans carried out daily from the air over the Reich in 1944/45?

In the end, the German defensive front in the west held out until the point in time feared by the English prime minister. Although began



Air sample collection
device 'Sniffer' of the US
Air Force.

in the month of March 1945 the outstanding creations of German weapons to come to the front; but it was already too late. The few weapons they had could no longer intervene in the decision. It took weeks, even days (!), and these delays saved the Allies and brought them closer to their war goals. These words do not come from Germans, but from Allied scientists.

Various circumstances should ensure that in the end Germany's atomic bombs could not be used.

If both sides had had nuclear weapons in 1944/45, the war would have ended very quickly – not, however, through the unconditional surrender of one side and the total triumph of the other, but through a mutually beneficial negotiation compromise. This would have spared millions of fatalities and prevented further suffering (expulsion, Iron Curtain).

End: It was only a matter of a razor-thin period of weeks or days...

After the war, the French scientist Dr. Albert DU CROCQ on the connection between the Normandy invasion and HITLER's secret weapons.¹

At that time, Albert DUCROCQ was one of the outstanding scientific hopes of the French and studied with the physics Nobel Prize winner Louis DE BROGLIE. Very quickly he received his doctorate in mathematics and physics (special field: nuclear physics). He was also an electrical engineer (specialty: cybernetics).

Due to his excellent scientific training and his perfect knowledge of the German language, he was commissioned to research the German secret weapons after the end of the war.

The achievements of German technology and science that DUCROCQ had seen at that time obviously impressed him so much that he became a convinced and tireless pioneer of space travel and nuclear technology in France over the next fifty years. In his later professional life, he held the highest positions in his country: at universities, in large companies and in the media, and in 1991 he received the 'Legion d'Honneur', the highest honor in France.

According to Albert DUCROCQ , the Allied supreme commanders were, for the most part, lukewarm about the German secret weapons projects

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~~SECRET~~

and it is estimated to have an endurance of 25 minutes. These bombs are launched from local airfields, and are radio-controlled, either from the ground, or possibly by aircraft. The few incidents reported by pilots indicate no success. They have passed over formations, and performed various antics in the vicinity of formations. It is believed that in order to be effective some 100/200 would have to be launched against a formation, and it is also believed that they will not be produced in sufficient quantities to prove a real menace in 1945.

5. MAGNETIC WAVE: The best information available is from very secret and reliable sources, and forces the conclusion that this weapon exists as a possibility. It is designed to cause failure of various electrical apparatus in aircraft. Technically it does not appear to be a possible serious threat in 1945. At most it would be effective at a few locations for preventing ground strafing. Evidence to date indicates that it could have little effect against high level attack, since the apparatus would be too cumbersome to permit its use in aircraft.

6. GASES APPLICABLE TO AIRCRAFT: Two types of gases applicable to aircraft are known. One is designed to cause pre-ignition, blowing the heads off cylinders; and the other is designed to break down the viscosity of lubricating oils. Under laboratory conditions, free from operational considerations, these gases are a distinct possibility. It is doubtful, however, that with proper fighter escorts a sufficient concentration of either of these gases could be thrown against our formations to have any serious effect. Similarly, it is doubted whether sufficient anti-aircraft guns are available to produce an effective concentration, and it is probably that any possible concentration would be no more effective than a similar amount of well-directed flak.

7. ATOMIC BOMB: Close check of every report, and close surveillance of the area in which tests are alleged to have taken place lead to the conclusion that such bombs are not a likelihood in 1945.

Dangerous US error. As late as January 19, 1945, an American Luftwaffe secret report gave the deceptive all-clear that close surveillance of the alleged German nuclear test site had yielded nothing. Wind and sea had long since removed the nuclear test traces that could be seen from the air at the time. The smug-sounding, dangerous conclusion was drawn from this that such bombs were unlikely in 1945. (Source: "An Evaluation of German Capabilities in 1945", Headquarters United States Strategic Air Forces in Europe, January 19, 1945)

and this was the reason why they landed their armies on the continent earlier than originally planned.

The landing in June 1944 was therefore made with some anxiety on the part of the Allied High Command, and General EISENHOWER was only able to breathe a sigh of relief after Avranches.

Only after the complete defeat of Germany in May 1945 did it emerge that, despite the Normandy invasion, there was only a wafer-thin period of weeks or days before the fate of the whole world was decided by the use of decisive new German secret weapons "5 after twelve". would have taken a completely different – totally unexpected – turn.

This means that eyewitness reports like that of Dr. Herbert BOLTE2 correctly classified. Bolte reported that as a member of the Waffen-SS he met a soldier on April 7, 1945 near Bleicherode, who told the scouting squad that important things were going to happen in a few days that could change the course of the war. But he shouldn't talk about it. Unfortunately there was no time for further questions.


Albert DUCROCQ knew everything first hand. He wrote that even before the end of the Second World War, numerous members of the Allied and German High Command were fully aware that one day history would recognize and describe the real course of the Second World War in a completely different way from how it was presented to the outside world at the time seemed.

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This book contains materials that may be controversial. For the avoidance of doubt, nothing in this book should be misconstrued as an attack on the elected government or constitutional order of any country in the world. Likewise, no attacks on living or dead persons or social groups are intended. The content of this book has been compiled to the best of our knowledge and belief and is for historical and informative purposes only. The interpretations expressed are the personal opinion of the author.

Appendix

Guidelines for the deployment of German naval forces in the event of an Allied landing in 1944



- 2 -

die Behauptung der erworbenen Gebiete gelten. Was wir in den ersten Feldzügen dieses Krieges errungen haben, gilt es nun zu halten !

- 2.) Auf Grund der geringen Zahl unserer Streitkräfte ist es nicht möglich, eine feindliche Großlandung an den Küsten unseres Machtbereiches mit den Mitteln der Marine allein zu verhindern oder abzuschlagen. Jede Einzelleistung und jeder Erfolg, gleichgültig durch wen und wo er erzielt wird, kann und wird jedoch durch Zeitgewinn und Schädigung des Gegners im Rahmen des gemeinsamen Kampfes aller Teile der deutschen Wehrmacht von großer, wenn nicht entscheidender Bedeutung sein.
- 3.) Über das sonst übliche Maß hinausgehende Beanspruchungen und Wagnisse sind in Kauf zu nehmen ! Gedanken an die Erhaltung von Schiff und Besatzung sind nicht am Platze. Alle unsere Streitkräfte können im Verlauf der Abwehrkämpfe in hoffnungslos erscheinende Lagen kommen. Hier können nur mutiges und entschlossenes Handeln, Vertrauen auf das eigene Können und die Überzeugung von der Größe der Aufgabe zum Erfolg führen. -

c) Aufgabe und taktisches Verhalten:

- 1.) Vor und zu Beginn eines feindlichen Landungsunternehmens ist die Aufklärung von entscheidender Bedeutung. Der Vorteil der Überraschung muß dem Gegner genommen werden. Durch vermehrten Vorpostendienst müssen die sammarschierenden Landungsverbände und der Schwerpunkt der feindlichen Operation frühzeitig erfaßt werden. Die im Küstenvorfeld eingesetzten Streitkräfte haben es daher zunächst als ihre Hauptaufgabe anzusehen, den Gegner nach Art, Zusammensetzung, Kurs und Fahrt zu erkennen, sowie durch schnelle und erschöpfende Meldungen die Gesamtverteidigung zu alarmieren. Feststellen und Melden haben in diesem Fall den Vorrang vor dem Angriff.
- 2.) Zum Einsatz in dem als bedroht erkannten Raum sind möglichst viele Streitkräfte aller Art zusammenzuziehen. Ihre wichtigste und erfolgversprechendste Aufgabe ist der rücksichtslose Angriff auf die erkannten Landungsverbände mit dem Ziel, den Gegner zu verwirren, seinen Aufmarsch zu stören und damit seinen Zeitplan zu verzögern. Wagemutiges und entschlossenes Anpacken auch eines überlegenen Gegners verspricht besonders zu diesem Zeitpunkt, in dem der Gegner den schwierigsten Teil seiner Aufgabe, die erste Landung, vor sich sieht, besondere Erfolge.
- 3.) Ausserhalb und an der Grenze der wirksamen Reichweite der Landeabwehrrartillerie liegt der Schwerpunkt des Abwehrkampfes bei den Seestreitkräften, besonders den Torpedoträgern und kampfkraftigen Sicherungsstreitkräften. Sie haben ihren Angriff solange fortzusetzen, bis sichergestellt ist, daß die Küstenartillerie voll zur Wirkung kommt. Die Gefahr von Verlusten durch eigene Waffenwirkung muß dabei in Kauf genommen werden.

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- 3 -

- 4.) Beim Einsatz der Küstenartillerie darf keine Zeit verloren werden. Jede Minute ist kostbar. In unklaren Lagen muß die Küste daher auch auf die Gefahr hin, eigene Streitkräfte zu beschüssen, unverzüglich das Feuer eröffnen. Enge Zusammenarbeit der Führungsstellen, Aufmerksamkeit und gut eingespielter E S-Dienst werden solche Lagen vermeiden helfen. Eine Grenze, bis zu der sich die Seestreitkräfte den eigenen Batterien nähern dürfen, kann und soll nicht gegeben werden.
- 5.) Im weiteren Verlauf der Anlandung sind die Seestreitkräfte aus dem Landungsraum herauszuziehen, an den Flanken zu sammeln und ggf. mit aus nicht unmittelbar bedrohten Gebieten herangezogenen Verbänden zu vereinigen.
- 6.) Der weitere Einsatz erfolgt der Lage entsprechend durch die operative Führung. Angriffssiele sind weitere Landungsverbände bzw. nach erfolgter Landung der feindliche Nachschubverkehr. Der Einsatz erfolgt unter bester Ausnutzung der taktischen Gegebenheiten. Dabei ist dem Gesichtspunkt Rechnung zu tragen, daß die Kampfkraft der verschiedensten Typen ihrer Eigenart entsprechend voll zur Geltung kommen soll. -
- a) Die Flottenstreitkräfte, vor allem die Kampfgruppe, werden am zweckmäßigsten von aussen bzw. gegen die Flanke der feindlichen Landung operieren. Schwere Schiffe, Zerstörer und T-Boote müssen rechtzeitig vermeiden, in den Stützpunkten eingeschlossen zu werden. Die genannten Einheiten sind offensive Kampfmittel. Ihre Stärke liegt in ihrer Beweglichkeit. - Ist ein Blockiertwerden nicht zu vermeiden, haben sie sich in die örtliche Verteidigung einzugliedern, unter Umständen als schwimmende Batterien.
- b) Für Torpedoträger, in erster Linie Schnellboote, sind die besten Erfolgsaussichten im zusammengefaßten Nachtangriff gegen große Ziele zu sehen. Eine Verzettlung der geringen Kräfte muß dabei unbedingt vermieden werden. Es ist jedoch zu bedenken, daß auch ein einzelner Torpedoträger, entschlossen eingesetzt, große Erfolge erzielen kann.
- c) Sicherungsverbände und Kleinfahrzeuge werden im allgemeinen in unmittelbarer Anlehnung an die Küstenverteidigung und unter Ausnutzung des eigenen Sperrsystems kämpfen. - Günstige Wirkungsmöglichkeiten bietet der Einsatz ihrer schnellfeuernden Artillerie in der Bekämpfung der feindlichen Landefahrzeuge.
- d) Den Einsatz der Schiffe des Ausbildungverbandes behalte ich mir vor. Der Verband hat es zunächst als seine vorrangigste Aufgabe anzusehen, seine Ausbildungsaufgabe zu lösen und für den weiteren Aufbau der Marine (U-Bootswaffe) die Besatzungen bereitzustellen. Die Herstellung der Gefechtsbereitschaft kann deshalb nur im Rahmen dieser Ausbildungsaufgaben erfolgen. Beim Einsatz des Verbandes

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- 4 -

wird der Stand der Ausbildung der Schiffe berücksichtigt werden.

D) Grundsätze für die Führung:

- 1.) Voraussetzung für den Erfolg ist, daß der taktische Einsatz aller Streitkräfte einschließlich der Küstenartillerie aufeinander abgestimmt und zu gemeinsamer, sich ergänzender Wirkung gebracht wird. Dazu ist gemeinsame Befehlshführung oder, wo die Organisation diese nicht vorsieht, enge möglichst örtliche Zusammenarbeit der Führungsstellen unerlässlich. Die Verbindung zur Heeresführung des angegriffenen Raumes liegt beim Küstenadmiral und Seekommandanten.
- 2.) Für alle Befehlshaber, die Seekommandanten, die Führer der Sicherungsdivisionen und den Führer der Schnellboote muß ausserhalb ihres Standortes eine Ausweichstelle vorbereitet sein, von der aus die Führung im Falle der Gefahr der Einschliessung ihrer Befehlsstelle sichergestellt ist. Für die Kommandanten von Festungen und Stützpunkten gilt der Befehl des OKW für Festungs- und Kampfkommandanten.
- 3.) Trotz der örtlichen Führung durch Küstenadmirale, Seekommandanten bzw. Führer der Sicherungsdivisionen muß es der höheren Führung möglich sein, wirksam einzugreifen und den Einsatz der Kräfte zu steuern.
- 4.) Die Chefs und Kommandanten müssen die Absichten der Führung kennen, damit sie bei Ausbleiben von Befehlen bzw. Abreißen der Nachrichtenverbindungen selbständig und verantwortungsfreudig handeln können, wie es die Lage erfordert. Sie haben sich auf die verschiedensten Möglichkeiten einzustellen und die entsprechenden ausbildungsmässigen und materiellen Vorbereitungen für alle denkbaren Lagen zu treffen.
- 5.) Für das Gelingen der Abwehr sind entschlossene Führung sowie klare, eindeutige Befehlsgebung in besonderem Masse erforderlich. Die Einsatzweisungen und Befehle für die Streitkräfte dürfen daher keine Bindungen, Hervorhebung der mit der Aufgabe verbundenen Schwierigkeiten sowie komplizierte Überlegungen enthalten. Diese führen nur zu Unentschlossenheit und Unsicherheit. Die Lage wird den Einsatz fordern.
- 6.) Die Besonderheit der Aufgabe erfordert besonders Beachtung der geistig-seelischen Vorbereitung der Truppe für den Einsatz. Wenn die Gegner zu einem entscheidungsanrufenden Angriff auf unseren Lebensraum antreten, werden ihre Truppen von schonungslosem Vernichtungswillen geleitet und auf brutale Kampfweise erzogen sein. Jede Besatzung und jeder Mann muß wissen, daß nur härtester, zäher Kampf zum Erfolge führen kann und dazu beitragen wird, daß wir die vor uns stehende entscheidende Phase des Krieges bestehen werden.

gez.: D 8 n i t z .

Telex from Rommel about the situation on the invasion front of July 15, 1944 to Adolf Hitler

The situation on the Normandy front is becoming more difficult every day, and is approaching a serious crisis. Due to the severity of the fighting, the extraordinarily heavy use of material by the enemy, especially artillery and tanks, and the effect of the enemy air force dominating the battle area, their own losses are so high that the fighting strength of the divisions is rapidly falling.

Replacements from home come only very sparingly and, given the difficult transport situation, only reach the front after weeks. Around 97,000 men lost, including 2,160 officers, including 28 generals and 354 commanders, i.e. an average of 2,500 to 3,000 men per day, so far a total of 6,000 men have been replaced. The material losses of the deployed troops are also extraordinarily high and have so far only been able to be replaced to a small extent, e.g. B. only 17 of 225 tanks so far.

The newly added divisions are unaccustomed to combat and, due to the limited equipment with artillery, armor-piercing weapons and anti-tank weapons, are not able to successfully repel large-scale enemy attacks after several hours of barrage and heavy bombing raids. As the fighting has shown, even the bravest troops are crushed piece by piece when the enemy uses material. The supply situation is so difficult due to the destruction of the railway network, the severe endangerment of the roads and paths up to 150 km behind the front by the enemy air force that only the bare essentials can be brought and, above all, artillery and launcher ammunition have to be saved. New significant forces can no longer be supplied to the front in Normandy. On the enemy side, new forces and quantities of war material flow to the front every day.

Enemy supplies are not disturbed by our own air force. Enemy pressure is increasing. Under these circumstances, it must be expected that the enemy will succeed in breaking through their own thin front, especially at the 7th Army, in the foreseeable future - 14 days to 3 weeks - and pushing into the vastness of French territory. The consequences will be obvious.

The troops fight heroically everywhere, but the unequal fight is drawing to a close. I must ask you to draw the conclusions from this situation immediately. I feel obliged, as Commander-in-Chief of the Army Group, to state this clearly.

Rommel, Field Marshal

Farewell letter from Field Marshal Günther von Kluge

My leader,

Your decision, handed to me yesterday by Field Marshal Model, relieves me of the command of Oberkommando West and Army Group B. The reason for this is evidently the failure of the tank thrust at Avranches, making it impossible to close the gaping hole to the sea. My 'guilt' as the responsible commander is thus clear.

Allow me, my Führer, with all due respect, to state my point of view. When you receive these lines, which I am sending through Obergruppenführer (Generaloberst) 'Sepp' Dietrich, whom I should get to know and appreciate as a brave, incorruptible man during the difficult weeks, I will no longer be. I cannot bear to be accused of having sealed the fate of the West through faulty strategy, and I have no means of defending myself. From this I draw the conclusion, and so I put myself where thousands of my comrades are already. I have never feared death. Life has no meaning to me anymore, and I'm on the list of war criminals to be extradited. As to the question of my guilt, I may say the following:

1. Due to the previous fighting, the armored formations were far too weak to guarantee success. Even if I had managed, by more skilful leadership, to increase their effectiveness, they would never have reached the sea, in spite of certain early successes they had.

The only division that could be considered more or less normal in terms of striking power was the 2nd Panzer Division. However, their successes cannot be used as a yardstick for judging the other armored formations.

2. Even assuming that Avranches could have been reached, the hole could certainly have been plugged, but the danger to the Army Group would certainly not have been averted, at most it would have been delayed for a while. A further northward breakthrough of our armored formations, as ordered, and the joining of our remaining forces in the attack to shake the entire position, was entirely out of the question. Anyone who knew the condition in which our troops found themselves, especially the infantry divisions, would have no hesitation in certifying that I was right. Your command was therefore based on assumptions that were not

passed. As I read this crucial order, I had the immediate impression that what was being demanded was something that would go down in history as a grand operation of the utmost daring, but unfortunately impossible in practice to carry out, so consequently the Blame would fall on the army commander in charge.

I did what I could to carry out your command. I also admit that it would have been better to wait a day before beginning the attack. But that wouldn't have changed anything in principle. That is my unshakable conviction, which I take with me to my grave. For the situation had already progressed far too far for there to be anything that could turn it around

be able. There were already much too strong forces on the southern flank of the Army Group which, even if the hole at Avranches had been plugged, could very easily have been supplied from the air and would have continued to receive support from the forces that had poured into Brittany. But our own basic line of defense was already so weakened that it could no longer be expected to hold out for any length of time, especially now that the stream of new Anglo-American forces was directed against them rather than through the Loch flooded south from Avranches. If, despite my better judgment, I agreed to the proposal of the tank commander and the Seventh Army to strike quickly, it was because we all knew very well the resilience of this army's northern front and did not trust it much, even then if we disregard the enemy's deployment to the south. It was therefore a question of acting quickly, especially since the air situation also called for quick action. As for the air situation, on which a day's combat depended almost entirely, the prospects for the hoped-for success were also extremely slim. And the barometer has remained consistently high to this day. On the basis of these facts I persist in my assertion that there was no chance of success; on the contrary, the attacks ordered were intended to decisively worsen the overall situation of the Army Group; and that's how it happened. After all, the western army was - seen from a personnel and material point of view - almost isolated. That was the necessary result of the desperate situation in the East. It was the rapid decline in the number of tanks and anti-tank weapons and the insufficient supply of the so-called standing divisions with launchers that brought about the situation (which was made infinitely more desperate by the losses in the so-called encirclements) that we are confronted with today. My strained rela-

ties to the new Chief of the General Staff (Generaloberst Guder), who sees me as his enemy, meant that I could not get hold of him, and so there was no way for me to get the armored support for the West, which would have been necessary. All of this was decisive for the development of the overall situation. My Führer, I believe I can claim to have done everything in my power to master the situation. In the letter accompanying Field Marshal Rommel's memorandum, which I sent you, I already explained how the situation might develop. Both Rommel and I, but probably all commanders here in the West who have combat experience against the Anglo-Americans with their material superiority, foresaw the present development. They didn't listen to us. Our views were not dictated by pessimism but simply by knowledge of the facts. I don't know whether Field Marshal Model, who has proven himself in every respect, will be able to master the situation. I hope so with all my heart. But if that is not the case, and if your new, much-desired weapons, especially those of the Luftwaffe, are unsuccessful, then, my Führer, resolve to end the war. The German people have endured such unspeakable suffering that it is time to put an end to this horror.

There must be ways and means to bring about the end and, above all, to prevent the Reich from falling into Bolshevik hell. The conduct of some officers who were taken prisoner in the East has always puzzled me. Mein Führer, I have always admired your greatness and your bearing in this gigantic struggle and your iron will to assert yourself and National Socialism. If destiny is stronger than your will and than your genius, it is in the will of Providence. They fought an honorable and great battle. This testimony will give you history. Now show yourself big enough to put an end to the hopeless struggle if it is necessary.

I part from you, my Führer, closer to you than you may have realized, in the knowledge that you have done your duty to the utmost.

August 18, 1944

Hail, my leader!

(signed) by Kluge
Field Marshal

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Errors corrected by the scanner

pp. 18,28: most feared - most feared p.
23, 1: infantry division - infantry division p. 61,
9: transport aircraft - transport aircraft p. 67, 9: airborne
- airborne p. 93,24: armored divisions - armored division
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Hwrowe – Hrowe p. 315, footnote 39 – 1 p. 321, 1: Dept. 1 – Dept. 1
p. 322,42: discharge capacity – discharge capacity.

p. 340, footnote 2: Rgton - Ryton
p. 351, illustration: WernheR - Wernher
p. 367,30: Misunderstandings to exclude - to exclude misunderstandings